INTRODUCTION
The United States has turned away immigrants infected with the human immunodeficiency virus ("HIV") under the public health ex clusion of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")1 since the mid-1980's.2 Since Congress codified the HIV exclusion in 1993,3 any 1. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § § 1101-1525 (1994 ( & Supp. 1999 ). The public health exclusion, found in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l)(A), states that immigrants who have a "communicable disease of public health significance" are inadmissible. It is one of several grounds of inadmissibility found in the INA. Prior to 1993, the Secretary of Health and Hu man Services had the discretion to decide which communicable diseases should render aliens inadmissible.
2. As discussed in Part II.A infra, the Public Health Service added acquired immune deficiency syndrome ("AIDS") to the list of dangerous contagious diseases excludable under alien applying for an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, or refugee status must first have a blood test for HIV.4 The HIV exclusion is not absolute, however. Each HIV-positive alien can apply for one of two waivers of the HIV exclu sion that are available in the INA. When an alien applies for immi grant or permanent resident status, he must disclose his HIV status on the application and, if he is HIV-positive, may simultaneously apply for a waiver of the exclusion. The first waiver, available to general immigrants under the INA, requires the immigrant to have an imme diate family member in the United States who is a citizen or lawful permanent resident.5 The idea behind this requirement is that family members will help to care, financially and otherwise, for HIV-positive relatives, thus relieving the financial burden on the government. The second waiver, available for "special" immigrants such as refugees, gives the Attorney General discretion to waive the exclusion "for hu manitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest." 6 In other words, this humanitarian waiver is re- 3. Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122, 210 (1993) . As a result of the 1993 Amendment, the INA declares inadmissible any alien "who is determined (in accordance with regulations proscribed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services) to have a communicable disease of public health significance, which shall include infection with the etiologic agent for ac quired immune deficiency syndrome." 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(l)(A)(i) (1994).
4. See 42 C.F.R. § 34.3(b) (1999) (discussing the requirements for serologic HIV testing of immigrants).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999):
The Attorney General may waive the application of -(1) subsection (a){l){A){i) in the case of any alien who -{A) is the spouse or the unmarried son or daughter, or the minor unmarried lawfully adopted child, of a United States citizen, or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi dence, or of an alien who has been issued an immigrant visa, or (B) has a son or daughter who is a United States citizen, or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or an alien who has been issued an immigrant visa . . .. 6. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3) (1994) . This section, which permits HIV waivers for certain refugees and asylees, reads:
(T]he Attorney General may waive (the public health exclusion] with respect to such an alien for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest. Any such waiver by the Attorney General shall be in writing and shall be granted only on an individual basis following an investigation.
Although the waiver articulated above is found in the refugee provision of the INA, it is reiterated in other sections of the INA that deal with special immigrants, such as the Chinese Student Protection Act. Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-404, 106 Stat. 1969 . Because this waiver is available "to assure family unity," it implicitly encompasses applicants who would qualify for the familial relationship waiver. Thus, even though an ap plicant cannot apply for both waivers, this waiver is broader, including applicants who would qualify under either waiver. See Rebecca Kidder, Note, Administrative Discretion Gone Awry: The Reintroduction of the Public Charge Exclusion for HIV-Positive Refugees and Asylees, 106 YALE L.J. 389, 400-03 (1996) (discussing the different waivers of the HIV exclu sion available under various provisions of the INA).
[Vol. 99:452 served for groups of immigrants whom Congress allows into the United States for humanitarian reasons. Which of the two waivers an immigrant can apply for depends on what type of immigration status he is seeking, because different waivers are available for aliens apply ing under various sections of the INA. When a new immigration law is enacted, Congress or the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") must decide which waiver should be available to HIV-positive immigrants applying under the new provision.7
The INS recently had an opportunity to decide which of these two waivers should apply to newly enacted legislation. Congress passed the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 ("NACARA")8 and the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998 ("HRIF A"),9 which allow Haitian, Cuban, and Nicaraguan immi grants and illegal aliens who have been in the United States since December 1995 to adj ust their status to that of lawful permanent resi dent.10 The humanitarian purpose of these laws, as this Note discusses, was to recognize and respond to the unique situations of these indi viduals who fled particularly horrific political conditions in their home countries by allowing them to reside permanently in the United States.11 NACARA and HRIFA (hereinafter "the Acts") constitute 
See DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1998, S. PRT. 106-23, at 657-68 (Haiti) (1999) (discussing ongoing human rights abuses in Haiti); DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997, 105 CONG., at 481-94, 591-601 (Cuba and Nicaragua) (1998) (discussing ongoing human rights abuses in Cuba and Nicaragua); see also IRWIN P. STOTZKY, SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI: THE PROMISE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1997); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, lmmigra-exceptions to the general adjustment of status provision under the INA, in that they grant permanent resident status to applicants even if they are inadmissible for many reasons, including illegal entry and po tential financial burden on the govemment.12 Applicants under the Acts are still subject to some of the inadmissibility provisions that are barriers to adjustment of status, including the HIV exclusion.
In regulations adopted pursuant to the Acts, the Immigration and Naturalization Service requires HIV-positive applicants under the Acts to apply for the waiver of the HIV exclusion that is dependent on the applicant's immediate family relationship with a United States citi zen or permanent resident.13 The INS regulations with respect to waiv ers of the HIV exclusion do not allow HRIFA and NACARA appli cants to apply for the waiver for humanitarian reasons available to other HIV-positive refugees and special immigrants.14 Seemingly, it would be easier for HIV-positive applicants to assert humanitarian · reasons for the INS not to deport them in their waiver applications than to prove the requisite family relationship because HRIF A and NACARA constitute Congress's recognition that the United States should not send these applicants who have been living in the United States since 1995 back to Haiti, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Thus, the INS effectively chose the waiver with more difficult requirements for HIV positive applicants to meet. 12. The Acts allow for adjustment of status for an alien who "is otherwise admissible to the United States for permanent residence, except that, in determining such admissibility, the grounds for inadinissibility specified in paragraphs (4) [ 13. 8 C.F.R. § 245.13 (c) (2000) (NA CARA); 8 C.F.R. § 245.15(e)(2) (2000) (HRIFA). These regulations refer HIV-positive applicants seeking waivers of excludability to a section of the C.F.R. that requires applicants subject to the public health exclusion to have a quali fying familial relationship with a United States citizen or permanent resident. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(4)(b)(l) (2000) (authorizing a waiver under § 212(g) of the INA, which requires a family relationship). See also Adjustment of Status for Certain Nationals of Haiti, 65 Fed. Reg. 15,835 (Mar. 24, 2000) (introducing the Final Rule for both NA CARA and HRIFA, eight days before the statutory filing deadline).
14. In its discussion of its final rule for HRIFA, the INS addressed comments it received relating to which waiver should be available for HIV-positive applicants under HRIFA. The INS rejected the possibility of allowing the humanitarian waiver for HIV-positive applicants, concluding that this waiver only applied to the adjustment of status of refugees under 8 U.S. C. § 1159, and that the INS did not have the statutory authority to adopt the humani tarian waiver here. See Adjustment of Status for Certain Nationals of Haiti, 65 Fed. Reg. at 15,837. As this Note argues, the INS misconstrued the legislative intent behind the Acts and their position within the INA as a whole. The INS did, however, open the possibility that HIV-positive Haitians who were paroled into the United States for the purpose of receiving medical treatment could be given a discretionary waiver. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.15(e)(2) (2000 ). It is unclear how this discretion would help Haitians without qualifying family members, however, since the familial relationship is mandatory to obtaining such a waiver. 17. See id. ("First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.") (citation omitted). In a footnote following the previous quotation, the Court clarified that intent should be determined through the traditional tools of statutory construc tion:
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject ad ministrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent .... If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an inten tion on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.
Id. at 843 n.9 (internal citations omitted).
18. See id. at 843 ("If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly ad dressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat ute.") (citations omitted).
19. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. · REV. 2071, 2091 (1990) ("The Court's own decisions, however, suggest that the mere fact of a plausible alternative is insufficient to trigger the Chevron rule."). But see Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 520 (arguing that a statute should be regarded as ambiguous when "two or more reasonable, though not necessarily equally valid, interpretations exist").
20. See Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 475 (1997) (dem onstrating through its reasoning that courts should consider "the history of evolving congres sional regulation in the area"); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (reasoning bacco Corporation v. FDA synthesized the Court's "holistic approach" to statutory construction as involving four considerations: 1) the plain language of the statute; 2) the overall statutory scheme; 3) legislative history; and 4) a consideration of other relevant statutes. 21 If, after conducting this multi-faceted analysis under the first prong of Chevron, a statute is still ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, courts move on to the second Chevron inquiry: whether the agency's regulation is based on a permissible construction of the statute.22 Am biguity arises only after a reviewing court has looked for Congress's specific intent using all of the traditional tools of statutory construc tion: plain language, context and structure of the statute, and legisla tive history.23 Although courts generally give agencies more discretion if the statute is ambiguous,24 the regulation must still be reasonable "in 23. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) ("The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole."); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) ("On a pure question of statutory construction, our first job is to try to determine congressional intent, using 'tra ditional tools of statutory construction. ' If we can do so, then that interpretation must be given effect, and the regulations at issue must be fully consistent with it.") (citation omitted); Cont') Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[W]e are not persuaded that Congress's intent is clear within the meaning of Chevron. That is to say, our employment of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation has left us in doubt as to what Congress had in mind on the precise issue at hand.").
24. See Cont'/, 843 F.2d at 1453-54:
[I]t is elementary in administrative law that, at least where Congress's intent is unknown, an agency's interpretation (if reasonable) is entitled to deference from the Article III branch. This notion is premised on the very nature of our system of government, with its time-tested separation of governmental powers .... To depart from the culture of deference (again, as always, where Congress's specific intent on the question at hand is unclear) is to do violence to basic structural principles relied upon by Congress and the President in creating the agency in the first instance and endowing it with powers to interpret, administer and enforce that portion of the law of the land.
See also Sunstein, supra note 19, at 2105 ("On the question of reasonableness, it seems clear that the agency must be given considerable latitude. But this is not to say that the agency may do whatever it wishes."). 26. See Cont'/, 843 F.2d at 1449 ("In our view, reasonableness in this context is to be de termined by reference both to the agency's textual analysis (broadly defined, including where appropriate resort to legislative history) and to the compatibility of that interpretation with the Congressional purposes informing the measure.").
27. See id. at 1452 (" 'Reasonableness' in this context means, we are persuaded, the compatibility of the agency's interpretation with the policy goals (as carefully identified in the manner previously described) or objectives of Congress.").
28. See id. at 1451 ("(P]recision of goal identification must be the order of the day ....
(T]he goal (or more precisely, the competing and conflicting goals) must be identified with care and respect for the compromise-laden legislative process."); see also Republican Nat'/ Comm., 76 F.3d at 406 ("Examining again the statute and its legislative history, we find no basis for questioning the reasonableness of (the regulation at issue]. As we have already con cluded, nothing in the statute or its legislative history limits the Commission to requiring a single request, or precludes the Commission from requiring a follow-up."). 30. See Carninetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms."); see a/so NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 81-83 (5th ed. 1992).
INS
31. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 99:452 required to have been paroled32 or admitted into the United States, which means they need not have entered the country legally. The key phrase in the Acts relevant to the HIV exclusion is that applicants must be "otherwise admissible," which indicates that the grounds for inadmissibility of immigrants under the INA (including the HIV ex clusion) apply to HRIF A and NACARA applicants.33 The Acts ex plicitly waive some of the inadmissibility grounds, including the likeli hood of becoming a public charge, failure to obtain a labor certification, entering the country illegally, and violating documentary requirements for entry.34 The Acts do not waive the HIV exclusion, however, and do not specify which waiver should be available for HIV-positive applicants; in fa ct, the Acts do not mention HIV or the public health exclusion at all.
Another interpretation of the Acts might conclude that the plain language is quite clear: Congress explicitly waived other inadmissibil ity grounds in the Acts, indicating that the legislators considered each 32. Parole is an executive power used in part to accommodate large numbers of refugees temporarily. Since the adoption of the Refugee Act of 1980, the Attorney General has used parole to allow large groups of "refugees" into the United States who do not meet the tech nical refugee definition under the Act but should be allowed to stay temporarily for "urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1999). Many HRIFA and NACARA applicants were paroled into the United States, al though it is not a requirement in the Acts. Because parole is only effective for a certain amount of time, when it expires, the parolee can be returned automatically unless the Attor ney General extends the deadline. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(d) (2000 ).
33. The Acts allow for adjustment of status for an alien who "is otherwise admissible to the United States for permanent residence, except that, in determining such admissibility, the grounds for inadmissibility specified in paragraphs (4) [ Individuals must apply for a waiver under Section 21 2(g) of the INA. To be eligible an alien must have a qualifying family relationship and also demonstrate that:
• Their illness will not pose a danger to the public health of the United States;
• The possibility of the spread of infection is minimal; and
• Their illness will not result in any cost being incurred by any government agency with out prior consent of the agency.
Questions and Answers, at <http://www.ins.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/questsans/HRIFAQA. htm> (last visited Sept. 10, 2000).
of the inadmissibility grounds in deciding which ones to waive, and thereby made a conscious decision not to waive the HIV exclusion. This maxim of statutory interpretation, exp ressio unius est exclusio al terius ,35 dictates that where the legislature enumerates items that are excluded from the law, the items not listed should be assumed not to be excluded.36 While the exp ressio unius maxim makes logical sense, it must be used with caution. Because the maxim looks only to the text and organization of the statute to determine legislative intent, it should not be relied upon if other tools of statutory interpretation, such as looking to the legislative history and purposes behind the stat ute, indicate that Congress's intent was otherwise.37 Here, Congress's explicit waivers of other grounds of inadmissibility shed light on its priorities. Notably, the Acts waive the exclusion of immigrants who could someday become a "public charge" (i.e., a financial burden on the government), demonstrating that Congress was willing to ignore the financial risk of allowing potentially costly immigrants into the country -the major impetus behind Congress's adoption of the HIV exclusion in 1993.38 Additionally, the complete waiver of the public charge inadmissibility undermines the need for the familial relation ship waiver of the HIV exclusion. The requirement of an immediate family member in the United States is financially motivated, rooted in Congress's effort to ensure that there is someone other than the gov ernment to take care of HIV-positive immigrants medically and finan cially. The humanitarian waiver seems more appropriate, given Con gress's humanitarian -rather than fiscal -priorities evidenced on the face of the Acts and, as discussed in Section 11.B, in the legislative history. Thus, a brief look below the surface of the Acts indicates that the exp ressio unius argument is not dispositive of Congress's intent in this situation. Moreover, the expressio unius argument is only powerful as a re sponse to an argument for waiving the HIV exclusion entirely; if Congress intended the Acts to eliminate the exclusion, it would have done so explicitly when it waived other provisions. The issue in this Note, however, is not whether Congress intended to eliminate the HIV exclusion entirely, but which waiver of the HIV exclusion should be available to HRIF A and NA CARA applicants. In the Acts, Con-35. Defined as: "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
36. See SINGER, supra note 30, at 216-17.
37. See id. at 234 ("(I)n the usual circumstances the application of the maxim is subordi nated to the basic rule of statutory construction that the intent of the statute prevails over the letter."); see also Bums v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991) ("An inference drawn from congressional silence certainly cannot be credited when it is contrary to all other tex tual and contextual evidence of congressional intent.").
See infra Section H.B.
[Vol. 99:452 gress is silent on the issue of which waiver of the HIV exclusion should be available. One might infer that this silence indicates that Congress intended the waiver requiring a family relationship, which is found in the general inadmissibility section of the INA and applied to all gen eral immigrants as a default. But legislative silence is not a dispositive indicator of legislative intent. 39 The text of the Acts, in terms of the permanent immigration relief they provide to a large number of refu gees, does not support the INS requirement that HIV-positive appli cants must have an immediate family member who is a United States citizen or permanent resident. Instead, the plain language of the Acts sheds light on Congress's broader purpose of providing widespread humanitarian relief, and the INS should have recognized this purpose and chosen the waiver for humanitarian reasons.
The arguments above indicate that the plain language of NACARA and HRIFA can be interpreted both ways on the issue of which waiver should be available for HIV-positive applicants. But the holistic approach to discerning Congress's clear intent under the first prong of Chevron does not end with plain language or the absence thereof.40 Because the statutory language is ambiguous, further exami nation of the legislative history of the Acts and the HIV exclusion and the structure of the Immigration and Nationality Act is necessary to discern 41. Courts should refrain from looking at the broad purposes of legislation when the plain language of a specific provision of a law is unambiguous. See Trustees of the Chicago Truck Drivers (Independent) Pension Fund v. Leaseway Transp. Corp., 76 F.3d 824, 830 (7th Cir. 1996). When the plain language is ambiguous, however, courts should look to the legis lative history of the law. See Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Robinson Cartage Co., 55 F.3d 1318, 1323 (7th Cir. 1995). Importantly, the ambiguity of the statutory language does not automatically indicate that Congress's intent was not clear in terms of the Chevron analysis. In other words, ambiguous language does not push the analy sis from Chevron prong one to Chevron prong two; rather, courts look beyond the statutory language to determine if Congress's intent was clear. See also Sunstein, supra note 19.
HIV exclusion of immigrants reveals that Congress viewed the finan cial reasons underlying the HIV exclusion as subordinate to its policy reasons for NACARA and HRIF A. Section II.A discusses Congress's policy reasons for enacting the HIV exclusion, demonstrating that the legislative history highlights the primary policy priority as a financial one. Section II.B discusses the legislative history of the Acts, which indicates that Congress intended the Acts to provide humanitarian re lief for immigrants who fled horrific conditions and should not be forced to return home. Additionally, the Acts reflect Congress's deci sion to further the United States' international foreign policy priorities in Nicaragua, Cuba, and Haiti and to provide immigration relief re gardless of the cost. This Part concludes that, given Congress's intent to grant widespread immigration exceptions to Nicaraguans, Cubans, and Haitians for both diplomatic and humanitarian reasons, the INS's strict waiver policy for HIV-positive HRIFA and NACARA appli cants (which focuses on avoiding costs) undermines congressional in tent. The INS should have recognized this humanitarian legislative in tent and chosen the more appropriate waiver of the HIV exclusion available under the INA -the waiver based on humanitarian reasons.
A. Congress's Policy Reasons Behind the HW Exclusion
To determine whether the INS's regulations concerning HIV positive applicants under HRIF A and NA CARA are consistent with congressional intent, it is necessary to consider the legislative intent behind Congress's creation of the HIV exclusion in immigration law generally. As the Supreme Court has directed, one level of holistic statutory construction under Chevron is a consideration of relevant statutes.42 The HIV exclusion, which is part of the INA, is relevant be cause every new immigration statute that requires applicants under it to be admissible, including HRIFA and NACARA, subjects appli cants to the HIV exclusion. This section examines the legislative intent behind the HIV exclusion, concluding that the primary reasons Con gress originally passed it in 1993 -financial and political concerns, not public health concerns -are not important under HRIF A and NACARA, because these Acts demote monetary concerns to secon dary status. This section then discusses Congress's intention to treat refugees differently than other immigrants with respect to the HIV ex-42. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting that acts of Congress "should not be read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions"); United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (statutory interpretation is a "holistic endeavor" that includes an examination of the statute's full text, its structure, and the subject matter); United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 (1940) (" '(A)ll acts in pari ma teria are to be taken together, as if they were one law' " (quoting United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 564 (1845))); Brown & Williamson, 153 F.3d at 162.
[Vol. 99:452 clusion, concluding that, by analogy, HRIFA and NACARA appli cants should be treated differently as well.
Although the United States has excluded aliens with communica ble diseases since the beginning of modern immigration law, the justi fication behind the exclusion has evolved from public health concerns to monetary and political concerns. The history of the public health exclusion goes back to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19 5 2, which declared immigrants who were infected with "any dangerous contagious disease" inadmissible.43 It was the responsibility of the Public Health Service ("PHS") (within the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS")) to determine which diseases should be in cluded on this list. In 1987, the PHS added AIDS to the list.44 In re sponse, the Senate unanimously passed an amendment requiring the PHS to substitute HIV for AIDS on the list. This quick congressional response, at a time when Senators knew very little about this relatively new and mysterious virus, was a sign that the HIV exclusion was to be a politically charged issue, born out of fears of the American elector ate, rather than a reasoned scientific response to a health risk.45 Con gress diminished the impact of this amendment when it passed the Immigration Act of 1990,46 which replaced "dangerous contagious dis ease" with "communicable disease of public health significance" and granted authority to the Secretary of HHS to determine which dis eases fit this definition. 47 The permanent codification of the HIV exclusion was the result of a long political battle.48 As scientists learned more about HIV, HHS realized that the virus was communicable only through certain behav iors, not by casual contact like tuberculosis (the type of disease the public health exclusion was designed to prevent), and in 1991, Secre tary of HHS, Dr. Louis Sullivan, proposed that HIV be removed from 48. In the debates over the codification of the HIV exclusion, Senator Simpson postu lated that the reason Congress wanted to take away the HHS Secretary's authority to deter mine which diseases were of public health significance was because HIV "has become now a political football .... I have a feeling that that is exactly what this is, under the pressure of a political campaign and a political response and a political payoff." 139 CONG. REC. 2,870 (1993) (remarks of Sen. Simpson).
the list.49 This proposal received a negative response from many con seratives in Congress and members of the general public.50 President Clinton took part in the debate as well, expressing his intention to eliminate the HIV exclusion shortly after taking office.51 Republicans in Congress responded by initiating an amendment to the National In stitutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 that provided that HIV would permanently constitute a "communicable disease of public health significance" under the public health exclusion.52
The primary concern reflected in the congressional debates over this amendment was the enormous cost of treating HIV-positive im migrants.53 Editorials on the subject also focused on the financial bur den on taxpayers.54 One of the strongest arguments against the fiscal rationale behind the amendment was that the HIV exclusion was not necessary to prevent the costs to taxpayers because the INA already contained an exclusion of immigrants who were likely to become public charges.55 The amendment's supporters rejected this response, perhaps because the issue had become so highly politicized.
49. Sullivan's reasoning for the proposed removal of HIV from the list of communicable diseases was:
The risk of (or protection from) HIV infection comes not from the nationality of the in fected person, but from the specific behaviors that are practiced. Again, a careful considera tion of the epidemiological principles and current medical knowledge leads us to believe that allowing HIV infected aliens into this country will not impose a significant additional risk of HIV infection to the United States population, where prevalence of HIV infection is already widespread. Our best defense against further spread of HIV infection, whether from a U.S. citizen or alien, is an educated public.
McCormick, supra note 45, at 160 (quoting Medical Examination of Aliens, 56 Fed. Reg. 2485 (1991)).
50. House Republicans sent a letter to Sullivan, signed by fifty-seven representatives, urging him to reconsider the proposed rule. Additionally, the HHS received more than 40,000 letters opposing the proposed rule, many from conservative religious groups. In re sponse to this backlash, the Justice Department tabled the proposal. Barta, supra note 2, at 329-30. The supporters of the HIV exclusion were also concerned with protecting the health of American citizens, although these concerns seem somewhat secondary to financial concerns.56 Moreover, these appeals to public health concerns were undermined by the medical experts' opinion that HIV does not fit the definition of a "communi cable disease of public health significance" under the 1990 Immigration Act, because it is not spread through casual contact and does not put people in public settings at risk.57 Ultimately, the opposi tion to the amendment from some Democrats, health care providers, the scientific community, and AIDS advocacy groups was not enough to ensure its defeat, and the amendment was adopted.58
The primacy of the legislators' financial concern in passing the HIV exclusion is evident in the waiver of the HIV exclusion available for general immigrants under the INA. This waiver admits HIV positive immigrants who have a close family relative who is a United States citizen or permanent resident.59 The familial connection has nothing to do with the public health risks posed by the HIV-positive applicant, but it is relevant to the likelihood that the applicant will not become a public charge if he has relatives to help finance his medical bills. The focus on financial concerns in the general waiver gives rise to I voted to oppose the Nickles amendment [which codified the HIV exclusion] today because I felt it attempted to make a medical decision for economic reasons. I do not believe Con gress is the proper authority for making medically and scientifically based decisions of this nature. The current public charge exclusions more appropriately address the economic con cerns and provide immigration officials with the basis for excluding those they believe will become public charges due to their medical conditions. If Congress is truly concerned with the economic costs associated with new immigrants, I feel it would be more appropriate to take a closer look at the public charge exclusions, rather than making medical decisions for political reasons.
139 CONG. REC. 2,855 (1993) (statement of the National Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, Washington, DC) ("Public charge provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act require all applicants for immigrant and non-immigrant visas to demonstrate that they are not likely to become public charges. Anyone who does not do so is denied a visa and precluded from either visiting or immigrating to the United States.").
As Senator Simpson noted, "[HIV]
is certainly a contagious disease whose only prognosis as far as we know -and it is a terrible tragedy -is death, and [it] already affects 1.5 million Americans." But he then went on to characterize the "public significance" of HIV in terms of medical care expenses: "[A] disease, which has such high medical costs, has to be of public health significance unless one would argue that health care costs are not of public health significance." This focus on the high cost of treating HIV indicates that, in Senator Simpson's opinion, the public health significance of HIV was bound up with its eco nomic significance. 139 CONG. REC. 2,870 (remarks of Sen. Simpson).
57. These medical experts, from organizations including the Centers for Disease Control and Health and Human Services, concluded that HIV is "not spread by casual contact, through the air, or from food, water or other objects, nor will an infected person in a com mon public setting place another individual inadvertently or unwillingly at risk." 139 CONG. an inference about which waiver Congress intended for HIV-positive applicants under NACARA and HRIF A. In these Acts, Congress ex plicitly waived the public charge exclusion, sending a message that ap plicants should be admitted under these special statutes regardless of the possibility of their becoming a public charge.(j() Congress must have known that applicants were likely to fa ll under the public charge ex clusion given the economic and political conditions from which they fled.61 The waiver of the public charge exclusion demonstrates that Congress believed that the purpose of the Acts overshadowed its fiscal concerns. Thus, taking the inference one step further, Congress im plicitly prioritized the humanitarian and foreign policy purposes of NACARA and HRIFA over the primarily fiscal purpose of the HIV exclusion.62 Although Congress probably did not intend to waive the exclusion entirely, the INS should have looked to the legislative pur pose behind the HIV exclusion and the public charge waiver within HRIF A and NA CARA to inform its choice between HIV waivers. Because the INS did not consider the purpose of the HIV exclusion, which is relevant under both prongs of Chevron, its regulations are contrary to legislative intent and thus an abuse of discretion.
Another relevant factor in the legislative history of the 1993 amendment codifying the HIV exclusion is Congress's intent to treat HIV-positive refugees differently than other HIV-positive immi grants.63 In the debates over the amendment, the Senate discussed the Simpson). This statement is not completely true, because the Refugee Act specifies that refugees and asylees are still subject to the HIV exclusion, although they can apply for a waiver based on humanitarian purposes and the public interest. See infra Section 111.B.
Interestingly, this debate took place at a time when over 200 HIV-positive Haitians who had fled their country were being detained in a quarantined camp in Guatanamo Bay. Sev eral Senators expressed concern about these people being allowed to come to the United States. But as Senator Simpson pointed out, these Haitians did not meet the definition of refugee anyway, because many of them fled for primarily economic reasons. Additionally, the detainees can be distinguished from HRIF A applicants because they were outside the United States and these debates took place before HRIFA was enacted. The comments are interesting, however, because they reveal a commonly held belief that a substantial percent age of Haitians are HIV-positive. See 139 CONG. REC. 2,860 (1993) (remarks of Sen. Nickles) ("I have heard reports that in Haiti alone, the HIV population may range as much as 11 percent, and that is a tragedy.").
65. Senator Bob Dole, discussing the waiver authority of the Attorney General, af firmed that "[n]o one has argued that this waiver authority should be altered." 139 CONG. REC. 2,866 (remarks of Sen. Dole). See supra note 64 (remarks of Sen. Simpson concerning the HIV waiver for refugees).
66. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res., Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851-53 (1984) (looking to the legislative history of the Clean Air Act to see if Congress's intent was clear on the is sue); see also Scalia, supra note 19, at 515 ("[I]t seems to me that the 'traditional tools of statutory construction' include not merely text and legislative history but also, quite specifi cally, the consideration of policy consequences.").
Chevron prong two.67 Explicit discussion of the waiver of the HIV ex clusion in the legislative history is not necessary to ascertain Congress's clear intent under Chevron prong one. Even if this failure to discuss the precise issue renders the legislative history unclear un der the first prong of Chevron, the legislative history sheds light on Congress's purposes to the extent necessary to determine that the INS's interpretation of that intent in its regulations was unreasonable under Chevron prong two.
Congress intended NA CARA and HRIF A to provide permanent immigration relief to Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans fleeing hor rific situations in their home countries. This section discusses the leg islative history of the Acts, which demonstrates Congress's humani tarian purpose. The legislative history of the Acts is relatively scant, as NACARA was never referred to or discussed in a committee, and both Acts were eventually passed within large appropriations bills. But there are enough sources of legislative history to understand Congress's purposes and policy reasons for enacting NACARA and HRIF A, including a Senate Explanatory Memorandum, floor testi mony from the House and Senate debates of NACARA, and a Senate immigration subcommittee hearing on HRIFA.68 Like the Acts them selves, none of the legislative history touches on the HIV exclusion is sue or the available waivers of the exclusion from which the INS might choose. Nonetheless, the INS had a duty to recognize the humanitar ian purpose demonstrated in the legislative history, and it should have chosen the less restrictive humanitarian waiver of the HIV exclusion. The humanitarian waiver, which takes into consideration humanitar ian reasons to refrain from sending the HIV-positive applicant back to his home country, is more appropriate, given that the Acts were based on an understanding that there are, in fact, humanitarian reasons to allow these refugees to stay in the United States permanently. This section concludes that under both prongs of Chevron, the INS had a duty to recognize Congress's humanitarian in tent in adopting the Acts and to choose the waiver of the HIV exclu sion that would better further Congress's goals.
67. See Cont'! Airlines v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("In our view, reasonableness in this context is to be determined by reference both to the agency's textual analysis (broadly defined, including where appropriate resort to legislative history) and to the compatibility of that interpretation with the Congressional purposes informing the measure."). [Vol. 99:452 Because NACARA was enacted approximately ten months prior to HRIFA and HRIFA's language was modeled on NACARA, it is appropriate to look first to the legislative history of NACARA. The purposes of the bill, as reported in the Explanatory Memorandum re printed in the Congressional Record, were as follows:
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that nationals of certain specified countries who fled civil wars and other upheavals in their home countries and sought refuge in the United States, as well as designated family members, are accorded a fair and equitable opportunity to demonstrate that, under the legal standards established by this Act, they should be permitted to remain, and pursue permanent resident status, in the United States. In recognition of the hardship that those eligible for relief suffered in fleeing their homelands and the delays and uncertainty that they have experienced in pursuing legal status in the United States, the Congress directs the Department of Justice and the Immigration and Naturalization Service to adjudicate applications for relief under this Act expeditiously and humanely.69 This statement of purpose indicates that NACARA was a humanitar ian measure, intended to give immigrants who fled inhumane situa tions permanent immigration relief in the United States. The House floor debates on NACARA support this purpose as well.70 Addition ally, Congress specifically directed the INS to adjudicate NACARA applications "humanely."71 The humanitarian waiver of the HIV ex clusion would have effectuated this mandate, because the waiver re quires the Attorney General to determine whether there are humani tarian reasons for the INS not to send the applicant back to his home country. Congress's statement of purpose recognizes the existence of such humanitarian reasons, and the INS should have followed Congress's guidance.
A secondary purpose behind NACARA was administrative con venience . The statement above mentioned the delays that NACARA applicants had faced in the processing of their asylum cases, and this concern was reiterated at other points of the legislative history as well.72 The concern is a legitimate one; asylum cases require an exten- 70. See District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 143 CONG. REC. Hl0,678 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1997) (statement of Rep. Davis) ("The inclusion of this legislation in the D.C. ap propriation bill will bring a measure of justice to thousands who have fled oppression in their native land to seek the freedom and opportunity offered in this Nation.").
71. See EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 69, at Sl2266.
72. See, e.g., EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM, supra note 69, at S12267 ("[A)pplication of the foregoing approach would greatly reduce the need for protracted analysis of the more subjective aspects of the suspension [of deportation) standard, thereby reducing the adminis-sive individualized assessment, which is expensive and leaves appli cants without status as they wait for a resolution.73 But it is notable that Congress's solution to the administrative problem was to allow all Nicaraguans and Cubans who had been in the United States since 1995 to become permanent residents, regardless of their potential cost to society or the likelihood of success in their asylum claims. The solution Congress chose to the administrative problem indicates that it was more concerned about providing a quick, permanent resolution and removing barriers to immigration relief than saving money.
The Senate Immigration Subcommittee hearing on HRIF A indi cates that Congress was motivated by similar humanitarian concerns when it passed HRIF A almost a year later. As when enacting NACARA, Congress was concerned, especially in light of the harsh deportation requirements enacted in 1996 in the Illegal Immigrant Re form and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), that Haitians who resided in the United States with temporary status might be de ported. Senator Spencer Abraham, Chairman of the Senate Immigra tion Subcommittee, elaborated on these concerns in his opening re marks:
In recent years, many people came to the United States under a legal or quasi-legal status, fleeing tyrannical regimes that were either enemies of the United States or allies whose domestic abuses were countenanced because of the country's strategic significance in the struggles for world freedom that were going on at the time. I noted during the (NACARA) debates that retroactive application of the new standards would likely force some of these people to leave, despite the roots they have laid down, and the fact that the conditions they were returning to remained dangerous. 74 Senator Abraham's remarks indicate that Congress was motivated by an unwillingness to send Haitians back to the dangerous situations they fled in Haiti. As with NACARA, the HIV waiver available to applicants who could demonstrate that there were humanitarian rea sons not to send them home would be more appropriate to fulfill Congress's purpose.
Congress had another purpose in enacting HRIF A that was not present in NACARA: ensuring that Haitian immigrants were treated trative burden on the Immigration and Naturalization Service and minimizing further delays in according relief to these individuals."). 
As stated by Senator Kennedy:
[Haitians] endured repression and suffered persecution at the hands of successive govern ments. Haitians supporting democracy have faced torture, extra-judicial killings, imprison ment, and other forms of persecution .... The call for democracy is being heard around the world, and America's voice has always been the loudest. How can we advocate democracy on the one hand, and then deny protection to those who heed our call and are forced to flee their homeland as a result? 144 CONG. REC. S13003 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). See Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the Sen ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 14-15 (1997) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (discuss ing the inequity to Haitian refugees in NACARA and in the history of U.S. immigration law's treatment of Haitian refugees in general); id. at 38-40 (statement of Miraan Sa, Am nesty International) (discussing the ongoing human rights abuses in Haiti).
The historical context of the United States' immigration policies toward and relationships with Nicaragua, Haiti, and Cuba indicates that Congress also had foreign policy reasons for enacting NACARA and HRIF A.78 In addition to the legislative purposes discussed above, NACARA and HRIFA represent congressional decisions to provide special relief above and beyond what is normally available through United States immigration policy -a recurring theme in diplomatic relations with these countries. Congress singled out Haitians, Cubans, and Nicaraguans for preferential immigration treatment to compen sate for the United States' involvement in -and in some cases, re sponsibility for -the political situations in these countries. 79 NACARA is a continuation of the United States' scheme of spe cial immigration protection for Cubans over the past several decades and a reiteration of American disapproval of Communism. The United States has used immigration policy as a political tool to fight Communism in Cuba since the Cuban Revolution of 1959 caused a mass emmigration to the United States.80 Because it viewed the Com munist regime under Fidel Castro as inherently abhorrent and oppres sive, the United States was (and is) reluctant to return anyone to such conditions.8 1 Coupled with this anti-Communist motive is a humani- Abraham) ("In recent years, many people came to the United States under a legal or quasi legal status, fleeing tyrannical regimes that were either enemies of the United States or allies whose domestic abuses were countenanced because of the country's strategic significance in the struggles for world freedom that were going on at the time."). Indeed, as Michael Walzer observed, a government feels the most obligation to assist refugees in two situations: when it has helped to turn the individuals into refugees by direct involvement in the unrest that has uprooted them, and when the individuals are persecuted precisely because they are ideologi cally and/or ethnically similar to its own citizens. MICHAEL w ALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE
(1983).
80. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 11, at 251 ("U.S. policy toward Cuba in the last forty years has been motivated exclusively by the interest of the United States in fighting Communism and replacing the current Cuban government with a democratic regime."). For over 30 years, the United States has had a policy of accepting people who are fleeing Communist oppression from the island of Cuba. The oppressive policies of the Castro re gime are known around the world. Not only has Fidel Castro supported violent revolution around our hemisphere, but he also has assisted in revolutionary organizations in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere.
The recent international custody battle over 6-year old Elian Gonzalez, who fled Cuba and was rescued in the high seas and brought to America in late 1999, highlighted the fact that (Vol. 99:452 tarian concern about human rights conditions in Cuba.82 Congress codified this sentiment in the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, which allowed Cubans who were paroled into the United States to adjust their status to lawful permanent resident after two years, with out having to surmount the barriers of proving their eligibility for asylum.83 In fact, the Senate explained that NACARA was modeled after the Cuban Adjustment Act.84 Cuban refugees continue to receive special immigration treatment in contrast to other refugees, most no tably Haitians. 85 The United States' immigration remedies for Nicaraguan refugees, including NACARA, grew out of a sense of obligation resulting from American involvement in the civil war between the Contras and the Sandanistas in the 1980s, which drained the Nicaraguan economy and compelled citizens to seek refuge.86 Congress responded with various Now we are confusing people who are fleeing oppression from Castro's Cuba with people who are coming here for economic reasons .... The people who are coming here for eco nomic reasons from Mexico and elsewhere are not coming because they are fleeing oppres sion, but rather they are coming here to make a living and we have a terrible problem with that. However, those who are fleeing for their lives, those who are fleeing to bring their families to safety out of the horrible conditions that exist in Cuba because of the Communist terror down there, those who do not want to be thrown into Castro's dungeons, have a right to be free.
86. Approximately 126,000 Nicaraguans applied for asylum in the United States be tween 1981 and 1991: "What happened when these various people came to our country was special immigration measures, but because none of them provided the permanent immigration relief that NACARA provided, Nicaraguans were left in an in-between status -neither permanent residents nor illegal aliens.s7 When Congress passed IIRIRA in 1996 and the INS began to apply its deportation provisions retroactively, Nicaraguans under these programs were in danger of deportation.ss Congress solved this quandary by enacting NACARA, which provided the per manent solution necessary to avoid deporting these Nicaraguans and thus maintain consistency in its policy of providing humanitarian relief to Nicaraguan refugees.s9 Congress intended NACARA to provide somewhat different than what happened to others who have come here .... Indeed, the ac tions with regard to the Nicaraguans in particular suggests that the American Government was actively promoting the notion that those Nicaraguans, fearful of the outcome of these uprisings, come to America." 143 CONG. REC. Sl0,199 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. Abraham).
87. These legislative responses began with the Nicaraguan Review Program from 1985 to 1995, which temporarily protected Nicaraguan asylum applicants from deportation while their asylum cases were under review and allowed rejected asylum-seekers to reapply for asylum instead of being deported. This reapplication provision essentially allowed 88. IIRIRA replaced suspension of deportation with the more restrictive cancellation of removal. Cancellation generally requires the applicant to demonstrate: 1) ten years of physi cal presence in the United States; 2) good moral character during that time; 3) no convic tions of certain crimes, including crimes "involving moral turpitude"; and 4) "exceptional and extremely unusual" hardship not to the applicant, but to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, parent, or child of the applicant. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l) (Supp. V 1999). This retroactive application of IIRIRA and the problems it caused for Nicaraguans was the subject of a class-action suit in a Florida district court. See Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 623, 650 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (granting preliminary injunction that prevented the INS from deporting any of the class members or dismissing their applications for suspension of deportation). This preliminary injunction was vacated and the case remanded by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in response to the enactment of NACARA, which rendered many of the class members' claims moot by allowing Nicaraguans to bypass the suspension of deporta tion process and apply for adjustment to permanent resident status. See Tefel, 180 F.3d at 1293-94; see also Kelly, supra note 87, at 226-27 (discussing the impact of the Tefel case on legislators' decisions regarding NACARA). [I]n the 1980's, this country actively encouraged people fearing persecution, fe aring death squads, fe aring disruptions of their communities to come to America. Then we took extraor dinary measures to make it fe asible for them to stay here, even those who had been denied asylum through the official asylum-seeking procedures .... widespread relief to refugees fleeing a political situation in which the United States was directly involved.
United States involvement in Haiti in the past decade has primarily focused on promoting democracy, but this focus has not been as acute as the obsession with defeating Communism in Cuba.90 When a mili tary coup cut short the democratically-elected regime of Jean Bertrand Aristide in September 1991, Haitian citizens fled the vio lence and poverty that ensued.91 Congress's solution -interception of Haitians at sea and return to Haiti -although congruent with the United States' historical treatment of Haitians, differed markedly from its policy toward Cuban refugees.92 In May 1994, President Clinton temporarily suspended this direct return policy and instituted a policy of transporting intercepted refugees to a safe haven on Guatanamo Bay for processing of their asylum claims.93 But this policy 92. From 1981 to 1991, U.S. policy toward Haitian refugees consisted of using the Coast Guard to prevent them from reaching the United States. See Lennox, supra note 90, at 703-04. After the 1991 coup, the administration introduced a parole process, whereby Haitians were intercepted at sea and interviewed at Guatanamo Bay. Those who met the threshold "credible fear" standard for asylum claims were temporary paroled into the United States to apply for asylum. See 143 CONG. REC. E2,382 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (extension of re marks of Rep. Conyers).
93. See Susan Martin, Andy Schoenholtz, and Deborah Waller Meyers, Temporary Protection: Towards a New Regional and Domestic Framework, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 543, was short-lived: after U.S. troops returned Aristide to power in October of 1994, the U.S. government sent the Haitians in Guatanamo Bay refugee camps back to their homeland, even though members of the military continued to make Haiti unsafe for Aristide supporters.94 As discussed above, HRIF A represents Congress's acknowledgment that U.S. immigration policy for Haitians was inconsistent with the policy for Cubans, given that Congress had similar foreign policy con cerns about both neighboring countries.
This discussion of the United States' involvement and interest in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Haiti supports the evidence of legislative intent found in the legislative history of the Acts. The United States has a long history of involvement in the political regimes of these countries, and feels a sense of obligation to its political allies who fled these abu sive regimes. Congress, recognizing the inhumane circumstances HRIF A and NA CARA applicants fled and the unstable political con ditions in their home countries, intended the Acts to provide a com prehensive, humanitarian immigration solution. In addition, wide spread relief negated the need to evaluate each applicant's asylum claim individually. When these concerns are compared to the financial justification behind the HIV exclusion discussed in Section II.A, it seems that the humanitarian HIV waiver is more consistent with Congress's intent than the waiver based on familial ties to the United States. Because the INS did not heed Congress's purposes when choosing the proper HIV waiver under the Acts, its waiver regulations are both contrary to legislative intent under Chevron prong one and unreasonable under Chevron prong two, and thus an abuse of adminis trative discretion. 554 (1998); STOTZKY, supra note 11, at 37 (discussing Clinton's move as a response to politi cal pressure from the Congressional Black Caucus and human rights groups). Many of these people were paroled into the United States after immigration officials determined that they had a credible asylum claim. HRIFA granted these parolees permanent residence status, based on a recognition that their asylum claims might not be successful and, even if they were, might not provide a permanent remedy. A comparison of NA CARA and HRIF A to other immigration laws demonstrates that Congress intended the Acts to provide perma nent immigration relief analogous to that available under the Refugee Act and other special immigration laws contained within the INA. Special immigrants under these laws can apply for an HIV waiver for humanitarian reasons, unlike general immigrants, who must apply for the waiver based on family relationships. The INS chose the latter HIV waiver in its regulations for NA CARA and HRIF A, even though both waivers were available in the INA and Congress considered NACARA and HRIF A applicants to be more like special immigrants than general immigrants. Thus, the INS's HIV waiver is inconsistent with the structure of the INA as a whole and thereby contrary to leg islative intent.
Looking to other immigration provisions within the INA is a le gitimate method to determine legislative intent under the holistic ap proach to statutory construction. As the Supreme Court advised in In this case, we believe that Congress has clearly precluded the FDA from asserting jurisdic tion to regulate tobacco products. Such authority is inconsistent with the intent that Con gress has expressed in the FDCA's overall regulatory scheme and in the tobacco-specific legislation that it has enacted subsequent to the FDCA. In light of this clear intent, the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction is impermissible. This Part utilizes the above method to determine the legislative in tent of NACARA and HRIF A by comparing the provisions and re quirements of the Acts with other immigration provisions. Section III.A contrasts the statutory requirements for adjustment of status to permanent resident under the Acts to the general requirements for immigrants who wish to adjust their status, concluding that, by delet ing many of the adjustment requirements for applicants under the Acts, Congress intended to make it easier for these Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans to adjust their status to permanent resident. Section IIl.B compares the statutory and regulatory provisions for adjustment under the Acts with the provisions for refugee and asylum status, arguing that the INS's restrictive regulations for HIV-positive HRIF A and NACARA applicants contradict Congress's attempt to allow these Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans to bypass the barriers to qualifying for asylum. Section 111.C analogizes the Acts to similar ad hoc legislation for immigrants from certain countries, concluding that because these laws are similar in purpose to NACARA and HRIF A, the INS should have looked to them to determine which waiver should be available for HIV-positive HRIFA and NACARA applicants. This Part concludes that, because Congress intended HRIF A and NACARA to provide permanent, widespread immigra tion relief that is more like refugee law and other special immigration measures than relief available to general immigrants, the INS should have imitated the HIV waiver available under special immigration laws rather than the one available under general immigration law.
A. Ad justment of Status fo r Immigrants Generally
A comparison of the requirements and barriers to adjustment of status from immigrant to permanent resident in the INA with those in HRIF A and NA CARA demonstrates that Congress intended to allow applicants under the Acts to bypass many of the barriers to obtaining a "green card" that most immigrants face. General immigrants apply ing for permanent residence status must demonstrate that they have been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States and must fit into one of the narrowly defined categories of eligibility de fined by the statute, of which all except immediate family relationships are subject to annual numerical limitations.100 In contrast, NACARA and HRIF A applicants can adjust their status without demonstrating that they were inspected, admitted, or paroled, which would be diffi cult for most of the applicants to prove; they must show only that they have resided in the United States since December 1995. 1 0 1 In addition, NACARA and HRIFA are not subject to numerical quotas.
More importantly, immigrants seeking adjustment of status under the general INA provision must be "eligible to receive an immigrant visa," which means that applicants are subject to all of the grounds for inadmissibility . 102 In contrast, HRIFA and NACARA automatically waive many of these grounds, including the exclusion of aliens who are likely to become a public charge, aliens who have been working in the United States without authorization or wish to do so in the future, un documented aliens, and aliens who are unlawfully in the United States.103 The fact that Congress waived the public charge exclusion for HRIF A and NA CARA applicants indicates a recognition that most of the Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Cuban applicants were poor, having fled their poverty-stricken home countries without any of their belongings, and would either have to work or obtain public assistance at least 103. See supra note 12. Indeed, HRIFA and NACARA waive all exclusions except pub lic health exclusions, exclusions on criminal grounds, security exclusions (e.g., terrorists and Nazis), the exclusion of draft evaders, exclusions for fraudulence and smuggling, and the ex clusion against previously removed aliens. This distinction is significant, because the grounds for inadmissibility that Congress waived generally render many immigrants ineligible for green cards. Consider, for instance, the employment exclusion: if an immigrant wishes to work in the United States, the Secretary of Labor must have determined that there are not enough available workers at the time and place where the immigrant wishes to work and that the immigrant's employment will not affect the wages or conditions of similarly em ployed workers -a difficult burden of proof for most immigrants. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5)(A) (1994). The only other option for immigrants is not to work, which would mean that they would probably soon become welfare recipients, a.k.a. "public charges" (unless they had in dependent sources of wealth), and would thus be excludable under the public charge exclu sion.
temporarily. 1 04 By waiving these important grounds for exclusion that apply to most aliens seeking to adjust their status, Congress exempted Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans from the grounds of exclusion that were probably most likely to prevent their adj ustment of status. The INS's regulations for HIV-positive applicants undermine Congress's efforts to make it easier for HRIF A and NA CARA applicants to ob tain permanent residency than for general immigrants, because appli cants must obtain the same HIV waiver as general "green card" seek ers.105
B. A Substitute fo r Asylum
As discussed in Section Il.B, Congress viewed Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans who had fled to the United States as refu gees, and intended the Acts to provide humanitarian relief similar to that available for refugees -essentially, a substitute for asylum status. The legislative history behind the Acts indicates that Congress was motivated by the "refugee-like situations" from which these Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans fled.106 Recognizing that many HRIFA and NACARA applicants would not qualify for asylum status for technical legal reasons, even though they deserved the same relief as refugees, Congress eliminated the barriers the applicants would face in qualify ing for asylum status. For instance, NACARA and HRIFA applicants are not required to prove that they would qualify for asylum, nor are they required even to have applied for asylum since they arrived in the United States.107 Additionally, Congress intended to avoid the long, expensive process of individualized assessment of each asylum appli cation by the INS.108 Congress thereby bypassed the long waiting pe riod asylum applicants face due to the backlog of asylum cases, so that applicants gain immediate status and rights, which affects their right to work and receive public assistance benefits. 109 Congress enacted the Acts partly because there was no guarantee that Nicaraguan, Cuban, and Haitian refugees who fled to the United States would qualify for asylum status under the Refugee Act of 1980.110 The Refugee Act, which incorporates the international defini tion of "refugee" from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, requires asylum-seekers to show that there is a reasonable possibility that they will be subject to serious human rights violations on account of their race, religion, nationality, political opm1on, or membership in a particular social group if returned to their home country. 111 Several elements of the refugee definition would be difficult for many NA CARA and HRIF A applicants to meet. One problem for applicants would be showing that they faced a risk of "persecution" as defined by asylum caselaw. Persecution is generally understood as a serious human rights violation, most notably a threat to life or free dom.112 Economic harm alone is usually not considered persecution, and refugees who flee to escape economic deprivations or to improve their living standards or chances for employment are typically denied asylum.113 Many NACARA and HRIFA applicants, particularly Haitians, would have difficulty showing that the risk they faced was beyond mere economic harm.114 A second problem for most Haitians, Cubans, and Nicaraguans would be proving that they faced a risk of persecution "on account of" one of the five reasons listed in the Con vention.115 The Supreme Court has interpreted this language to require an asylum applicant to provide direct or circumstantial evidence that his persecutors were motivated to persecute him because of his race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.116 Thus, asylum applicants must make some showing of their persecutors' intent to harm them, beyond a threat of indiscrimi nate harm to the entire population.117 This persecutory intent require ment would be difficult for many NACARA and HRIF A applicants, whose fears were based on generalized poverty and violence.118 Through the Acts, Congress allowed applicants to bypass these asylum requirements and provided a substitute for the difficult asylum proc ess.119
114. See Harris, supra note 91, at 278-83 (1993) (discussing the difficulty Haitians have qualifying for asylum under U.S. refugee law). The most important refugee protection law arguably, however, is not any of the specific refugee laws, laws that have the word 'refugee' in their title. Rather, it is the Attorney Gen eral's power to parole people into the country; that is to allow for their provisional entry, even though no law specifically provides for their admission .... The refugee admission pro cess is a complicated one. It can take months, or even years, and the problem is we can't al ways plan for the existence of refugees. The only people who can plan for whether people are going to be persecuted are the persecutors themselves .... The parole power is often bet ter suited to that kind of quick reaction than the formal refugee admission process.
Like NA CARA and HRIF A, the Refugee Act was humanitarian in purpose, based on the United States' duty of "non-refoulement," which prevents countries who are parties to the Refugee Convention from sending refugees back to countries where they face persecu tion.120 Unlike the Acts, Congress specified in the Refugee Act that the waiver based on humanitarian purposes should be available to HIV-positive refugees.121 Because the plain language of the Acts did not indicate which waiver of the HIV exclusion was available to appli cants, the INS had a choice in its regulations between the waiver avail able for refugees and the waiver available for general immigrants. In keeping with Congress's intent to grant NACARA and HRIF A appli cants quasi-refugee relief, the INS should have copied the waiver ar ticulated in the Refugee Act, as opposed to the waiver in the general immigrant provisions of the INA.
Because the INS did not compare the purposes of the Acts to the purposes of the Refugee Act, it did not follow the holistic approach to determining Congress's intent that the Supreme Court has recom mended. The INS's final rule and response to comments on HRIF A indicates that it considered imitating the humanitarian waiver in the Refugee Act, at least for HRIFA applicants, but rejected the idea. Mr. Rees then went on to discuss the need for a more permanent solution to the parole power, which NACARA and HRIFA provide.
120. See HATHAWAY, supra note 111, at 14 (defining "non-refoulement" as "the duty to avoid the return of a refugee to a country where she faces a genuine risk of serious harm").
121. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(3) (1994) (allowing refugees to apply to the Attorney Gen eral for a discretionary waiver "for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest"). 
See id. :
When read in its entirety, it is clear that the waiver provision contained in [the refugee pro vision] of the Act applies only to aliens who are adjusting status under that section, not to aliens who are adj usting status under other provision of law, including HRIFA. The De partment does not have the statutory authority to make this change. Accordingly, this sug gestion cannot be adopted.
124. Professor Cass Sunstein supports granting greater latitude to administrative agen cies to look beyond the formal text of a statute to implement Congress's policy choices: "As against modem formalists, we might urge that administrative agencies should be authorized HRIF A, the agency had a duty to compare the humanitarian purpose of NACARA and HRIF A to other immigration provisions motivated by similar reasons (such as the Refugee Act) and give HIV-positive applicants the opportunity to apply for the humanitarian waiver.
C. The HIV Exclusion Under Other Sp ecial Immigration Measures
Congress intended the Acts to provide a permanent immigration status similar to past ad hoc statutes that transformed temporary, emergency immigration relief for groups of refugees fleeing particular countries into permanent resident status. These laws, like NACARA and HRIF A, represent Congress's decision that the United States should not send these refugees back to their home countries for hu manitarian reasons. As Senator Abraham stated in the subcommittee hearing on HRIF A, the Acts were modeled after these ad hoc meas ures.125 Because the Acts have a similar purpose and provide similar relief to these special measures, the INS should have looked to the HIV waiver available under them when crafting its regulations for HIV-positive HRIFA and NACARA applicants.
Senator Abraham mentioned two recent examples of such ad hoc immigration measures. The Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992 allowed Chinese students who had been involved in the Tiananmen Square massacre and had subsequently been granted Deferred En forced Departure ("DED") status to adjust their status to permanent resident.126 Congress was motivated by both humanitarian and foreign policy reasons, as in its consideration of NACARA and HRIFA.127 to reject the 'text' in situations where common law judges would not be so authorized, at least when there is no evidence of a considered legislative judgment against the agency's in terpretation." Cass R. Sunstein Under U.S. law, one traditional way in which relatively large numbers of individuals paroled into the country have gained permanent residence has been for Congress to pass a special law that permits this to happen ... purposes of the Acts to other immigration provisions, the INS should have recognized that Congress intended HRIF A and NA CARA to be more like refugee status and other special immigration statutes rather than adjustment of status for general immigrants. To carry out legisla tive intent, the INS should have copied the waiver in these special im migration provisions, based on humanitarian purposes, rather than the waiver for general immigrants.
CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 and the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998 to provide permanent immigration remedies to refugees fleeing inhumane situations in countries toward which the United States has long demonstrated a foreign policy commitment. The HIV exclusion of immigrants was enacted primarily for financial reasons, while Congress's purpose behind HRIF A and NACARA was primarily humanitarian. The INS, charged with developing regulations to further congressional mandates, should have recognized that Con gress intended these Acts to be similar to the Refugee Act and other special immigration measures, and allowed HIV-positive applicants to obtain a waiver based on humanitarian purposes. Because the INS did not follow Congress's clear intent or, in the alternative, did not inter pret Congress's purposes reasonably, the waiver regulation should be vacated by courts or voluntarily changed by the INS. Alternatively, Congress should pass an amendment to the Acts that specifies that the humanitarian waiver is available for HIV-positive applicants. These reforms are necessary to fulfill Congress's goal of providing wide spread immigration relief to refugees from Haiti, Cuba, and Nicaragua.
